In the ever-escalating arms race between cybercriminals and cybersecurity defenders, a new and particularly insidious ransomware family, dubbed Reynolds, has emerged. This sophisticated threat is raising alarms among researchers due to its innovative approach to defense evasion: embedding a ‘Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver’ (BYOVD) component directly within its payload. This tactic allows Reynolds to bypass Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions with alarming efficiency, making it a formidable challenge for organizations worldwide.
Reynolds Ransomware: A New Breed of Evasion
Cybersecurity experts have unveiled the intricate workings of Reynolds ransomware, highlighting its built-in BYOVD capability. Unlike traditional attacks where a vulnerable driver might be deployed as a separate precursor tool, Reynolds integrates this critical component directly into its core payload. This seamless integration streamlines the attack chain, making detection and intervention significantly harder for security teams.
The BYOVD Tactic: Bundled for Stealth
BYOVD is a well-known adversarial technique that exploits legitimate, albeit flawed, driver software to achieve elevated privileges and neutralize EDR solutions. By disarming these crucial security tools, ransomware can operate unimpeded, encrypting files and exfiltrating data without triggering alerts. While not entirely novel – similar bundling tactics were observed with Ryuk ransomware in 2020 and Obscura in 2025 – Reynolds’ adoption of this method underscores a growing trend towards more self-contained and stealthy ransomware operations.
As Symantec and Carbon Black Threat Hunter Team researchers noted, “Normally, the BYOVD defense evasion component of an attack would involve a distinct tool that would be deployed on the system prior to the ransomware payload… However, in this attack, the vulnerable driver (an NsecSoft NSecKrnl driver) was bundled with the ransomware itself.” This consolidation of capabilities not only simplifies the attacker’s modus operandi but also presents a more challenging defense scenario.
The Vulnerable Link: NSecKrnl Driver
At the heart of the Reynolds campaign is the NsecSoft NSecKrnl driver, which is exploited due to a known security flaw (CVE-2025-68947, CVSS score: 5.7). This vulnerability allows the ransomware to terminate arbitrary processes, effectively shutting down a wide array of security programs from leading vendors like Avast, CrowdStrike Falcon, Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR, Sophos (including HitmanPro.Alert), and Symantec Endpoint Protection. The NSecKrnl driver has a history of misuse, previously leveraged by threat actor Silver Fox to disable endpoint security before deploying ValleyRAT, demonstrating its proven utility in the cybercriminal toolkit.
The efficacy of BYOVD stems from its reliance on legitimate, signed files, which are inherently less likely to trigger immediate red flags from security systems. By embedding this evasion directly into the ransomware, attackers create a “quieter” operation, minimizing external file drops and further reducing the chances of early detection.
Beyond Reynolds: A Broader Threat Landscape
The emergence of Reynolds ransomware coincides with several other significant developments in the cyber threat landscape, illustrating the dynamic and evolving nature of cybercrime.
Other Noteworthy Ransomware Developments
GLOBAL GROUP: Air-Gapped Threats and Local Operations
Recent weeks have seen a high-volume phishing campaign deploying the GLOBAL GROUP ransomware via Windows shortcut (LNK) attachments. This ransomware is particularly notable for its ability to operate entirely locally on compromised systems, making it compatible with air-gapped environments. Crucially, it conducts no data exfiltration, focusing solely on local encryption, which complicates traditional detection and response strategies that often rely on network traffic analysis.
WantToCry: Abusing Cloud Infrastructure
The WantToCry group has been observed exploiting virtual machines (VMs) provisioned by ISPsystem, a legitimate virtual infrastructure management provider. By leveraging a design weakness in VMmanager’s default Windows templates – which reuse static hostnames and system identifiers – threat actors can rapidly deploy thousands of VMs. This allows bulletproof hosting providers to lease these machines to various ransomware operators, including LockBit, Qilin, Conti, and BlackCat, and facilitate widespread malware delivery, significantly complicating takedown efforts.
DragonForce: The Professionalization of Extortion
In a move reflecting the increasing professionalization of ransomware operations, the DragonForce group has introduced a “Company Data Audit” service. This service is designed to support affiliates during extortion campaigns, providing them with tools and expertise to maximize pressure on victims. Such offerings highlight the sophisticated business models now underpinning major ransomware syndicates.
The continuous evolution of ransomware tactics, from embedded BYOVD drivers to the abuse of cloud infrastructure and specialized extortion services, underscores the critical need for robust, multi-layered cybersecurity defenses and constant vigilance against emerging threats.
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